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The Legal Implications under Federal Law when 
States Enact Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom 
Laws for Students and Employees 
 
Marka B. Fleming* 
Gwendolyn McFadden-Wade** 
 
. . .  It is essential for [students and] employees to be able to [go to 
school and] work in a manner consistent with how they live the rest 
of their daily lives, based on their gender identity.* 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Gavin Grimm, a transgender1 boy, sued the Gloucester High School in 
Gloucester, Virginia, because the school board adopted a policy that 
prevented him from using the boy’s bathroom.2  The newly adopted policy 
required all students to use the bathroom based on their biological sex 
rather than their gender identity.3  The case reached the United States Court 
 
* * J.D., Associate Professor of Business Law, North Carolina A & T State University. 
*J.D., LL.M., CPA, Associate Professor of Accounting, North Carolina A & T State 
University. 
* Best Practices: A Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers, available at 
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3795.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 1. For purposes of this article, the term “‘transgender’ is an umbrella term for persons 
whose gender identity, gender expression or behavior does not conform to that typically 
associated with the sex to which they were assigned at birth.  And, “gender identity refers to 
a person’s internal sense of being male, female or something else.”  AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.ORG, available at http://www.apa.org/topics/sexuality/trans 
gender.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 2. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 7026 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 
2016); see also, Richard Fausset, Appeals Court Favors Transgender Student in Virginia 
Restroom Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/ 
20/us/appeals-court-favors-transgender-student-in-virginia-restroom-case.html (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2017).   
 3. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7026 at *9 (4th Cir. Apr. 
19, 2016). 
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2016.  Citing a violation of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments Act of 1972, a federal statute prohibiting 
federally funded educational programs from discriminating against or 
denying benefits to individuals based on their sex,4 the appellate court held 
the school board’s actions were illegal. 
Gloucester High School is not the only educational institution to 
require students to use the bathroom based on the student’s biological sex.5  
Ashton Whitaker, a transgender high school senior, was informed by the 
Kenosha Unified School District in Kenosha County Wisconsin that he 
could not use the boy’s bathroom.6  In response, Ashton filed a lawsuit to 
enjoin the school from: (1) enforcing any policy that denies the him access 
to the boy’s restroom at school and school-sponsored events; (2) taking any 
formal or informal disciplinary action against him for using the boy’s 
restroom; (3) using, causing or permitting school employees to refer to the 
him by his female name and female pronouns; and (4) taking any other 
action that would reveal the his transgender status to others at school.7  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin heard the 
case and concluded that Ashton had shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of the case.  A preliminary injunction was issued.8 
Educational institutions, such as the secondary schools in the 
previously cited cases, are regulated by Title IX yet they are by no means 
unique in their effort to restrict the use of bathrooms by transgender 
individuals.  Employers have required employees to use the bathroom 
based on their biological sex.9  In response, transgender individuals have 
 
 4. Id. at *29–31; see also, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 5. See e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified High Sch., No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 129678 (Sept. 22, 2016) (granting a preliminary injunction to a transgender 
male whose high school prevented him from using the male’s restroom); Doe v. Reg’l Sch. 
Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 603 (Me. 2014) (holding that a school’s actions of denying a 
transgender female student the right to use the girl’s restroom violated the Maine’s Human 
Rights Act); see also, Ivey DeJesus, Transgender Bathroom Rights and Nondiscriminatory 
Laws are about to Top State Issues in Pa., PENNLIVE, May 17, 2016, available at 
http://www.pennlive.com/news/2016/05/bathroom_bills_non-discriminat.html  (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2017) (“ In recent weeks two Philadelphia suburban school districts adopted 
comprehensive policies addressing the rights of transgender students. . . . The same 
conversation is happening in at least two other school districts—the Pine-Richland School 
District in Allegheny County and the Lower Merion School District, in Montgomery 
County.”); Letitia Stein, In U.S. Bathroom Battles, Florida Transgender Student Fights for 
Equality, REUTERS, Apr. 20, 2016, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lgbt-
students-idUSKCN0XH0YQ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (“For 17-year-old transgender male 
Nate Quinn, using the bathroom at school became a battle.  The Florida high school student 
was barred last year from using the boys’ restroom.”). 
 6. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified High Sch., No. 16-CV-943-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129678 (Sept. 22, 2016). 
 7. Id. at *10–11. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
transsexuals is not a protected class under Title VII and the employee failed to allege a sex 
stereotyping claim when a transgender employee’s employer failed to allow him to use the 
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defended their rights to use the bathroom of their choice often by citing 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal statute that prohibits 
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of “race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”10  For example, in 2002, a 
transgender female adjunct instructor in Avondale, Arizona, sued her 
employer, the Estrella Mountain Community College, claiming the 
community college violated her Title VII rights.11  The lawsuit arose after 
the community college prevented her from using the women’s bathroom 
“until such time as she provided proof that she did not have male 
genitalia.”12 
Likewise, in 2004, the Utah Transit Authority fired a transgender 
female bus driver after she merely asked to use the women's bathroom.13  
The employer’s decision to terminate prevailed when, three years later, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that Title 
VII had not been violated.14 
The aforementioned cases raise the question: what legal rights do 
transgender individuals have to use the bathroom of their choice?  Clearly 
these rights are directly affected by the school and employer policies, but 
more importantly there is a veiled issue of discrimination that quietly looms 
in the shadows.  The discrimination issue surfaces when, as in the 
aforementioned cases, bathroom policies based solely on biological sex, 
purposefully emerge and restrict the use of these facilities by transgender 
individuals.15  Is the right to use the bathroom of one’s choice a relevant 
issue? Is it a timely issue? Is the issue politically charged? At the federal 
level, the issue has been discussed, addressed, packaged and settled only to 
be unpacked again.  At the state level, the issue has been debated, almost 
legislated in several states but is certain to remain afloat because of deep 
rooted public opinion, the probability of litigation and the question of 
whether restrictive bathroom policies violate federal statutes. 
This article focuses on the transgender bathroom issue at the state level 
and provides insight into the attempts by states to turn policy into law.  
First, the article surveys a sample of contemporary transgender bathroom 
legislation, proposed or adopted by states throughout the country.  
Afterwards, it discusses several federal cases in which courts addressed the 
 
woman’s restroom); Goins v. West Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 2001) (holding that 
denying a transgender female the right to use the female restroom did not violate 
Minnesota’s Human Rights Act).  
 10. See id.; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 11. Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. College Dist., No. CIV 02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29825 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2004). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See generally, Vincent J. Samar, Article, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Use 
the Bathroom Consistent with One’s Gender Identity, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 33 
(2016); Brian Eisner, Article, Being a Transgender Student: An Uphill Fight for Equality, 
28 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 419 (2016). 
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legality of biology-based transgender bathroom laws in the public 
educational and employment sectors.  Next, it explores the legal 
implications to be considered by states when determining whether to base 
their individual state law on biology or gender identity.  Finally, the article 
concludes by arguing that transgender bathroom laws, if enacted, should be 
based on an individual’s gender identity.  Such a result would address the 
discrimination issue and reduce potential liability for state agencies and 
other government entities.  
II.  MODERN APPLICATIONS OF TRANSGENDER 
BATHROOM LAWS 
Numerous state governments have wrestled with the question of a 
transgender individual’s use of public bathrooms based on biology or 
gender identity and have proposed laws to allow or restrict such use.16  For 
purposes of this article, the term “gender-identity based” bathroom laws 
refers to those laws that base a person’s right to use a public bathroom or 
public facility on the gender with which the person identifies.  The term 
“biology-based” bathroom laws refers to those laws that base a person’s 
right to use a public bathroom or public facility on the individual’s 
biological sex.  Only a handful of states have been proactive in enacting 
bathroom laws specific to transgender individuals by granting them the 
right to use the bathroom based on gender identity.  Conversely, several 
states vehemently oppose this position, but a lack of legislation, is 
revealing. 
A. STATE-ENACTED GENDER-IDENTITY BASED LAWS 
A few states, eight to be exact, and the District of Columbia, have 
enacted laws specifically protecting the rights of students and employees to 
use public bathrooms and facilities based on their gender identity.17  The 
short list includes: California, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, New Jersey, 
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.18  In these jurisdictions, the law is 
 
 16. See infra notes 18-88. 
 17. See D.C. Code Mun. Regs. tit. 4 § 802 (2018); (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“In order 
to meet the obligations to prohibit discrimination based on gender identity or expression as 
set forth in the Act, the Office and the Commission adopt this chapter . . . “[t]o implement 
the provisions of the Act regarding discrimination based on gender identity or expression in 
employment, housing, public accommodations, or educational institutions, including all 
agencies of the District of Columbia government and its contractors.”); see also, 
Transgender People and the Law, ACLU, available at https://www.aclu.org/know-your-
rights/transgender-people-and-law (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 18. See CA Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing, DFEH Issues Guidance for California 
Employers on Transgender Employees, (2017), available at https://dfeh.ca.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/32/2017/06/LozanoPR20160217.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“Under 
California law, all employees have the right to use restroom and locker room facilities that 
correspond to their gender identity.”); S.B. 08-200, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Co. 
2008) (enacted); Colorado Civil Rights Commission Rules and Regulations, §3 CCR 708-1 
(2014); State of Delaware Guidelines on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative 
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education/student specific, employment specific, or a combination of both.  
For example, California’s School Success and Opportunity Act (“SSOA”), 
enacted in 2013, was a transgender bathroom law based on gender identity, 
specific to students.19  This act “requires that a pupil be permitted to 
participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including 
athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her 
gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”20  
The state had already enacted a law specific to employment ten years 
earlier. 
The Fair Employment and Housing Act of 2004 (“FEHA”), made it 
illegal for all California employers “with 5 or more employees to fire, fail 
to hire or discriminate against employees who are perceived to be 
transgender or gender non-conforming.”21  The law applied to both private 
and public employers in California.22  To clarify the application of the law, 
in February 2016, the California Department of Fair Employment and 
 
Action Gender Identity Guidelines, available at http://www.delawarepersonnel.com/po 
licies/documents/sod-eeoc-guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“An employee whose 
gender identity does not match his or her assigned sex at birth, including a transitioning 
employee, will have access to the gender-specific facilities (including restrooms) that 
corresponds to his or her gender identity, beginning when the employee first begins 
presenting in accordance with such gender identity.”); Iowa Code §216.2 (2017) (covering 
both students and employees and defining the term “‘gender identity’ as a gender-related 
identity of a person, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth”); S.B. 3067, 217th 
Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.J. 2017) (introduced) (“The Commissioner of Education shall develop 
and distribute to school districts guidelines concerning transgender students . . .  The 
guidelines developed by the commissioner shall include, but not be limited to, information 
and guidance regarding the following: use of restrooms and locker rooms, including not 
requiring a transgender student to use a restroom or locker room that conflicts with the 
student’s gender identity, and providing reasonable alternative arrangements if needed to 
ensure a student’s safety and comfort.”); Guidance to School Districts: Creating a Safe and 
Supportive School Environment for Transgender Students, Oregon Department of Education 
(2016), available at http://media.oregonlive.com/education_impact/other/Transgender%20 
Student%20Guidance%205-5-16.pdf (last visited July 24, 2017); Sex, Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity: A Guide to Vermont’s Anti-Discrimination Law for Stores, 
Restaurants, Schools, Professional Offices and Other Places of Public Accommodation, 
State of Vermont Human Rights Commission, available at http://hrc.vermont.gov/sites/hrc/ 
files/publications/trans-pa-brochure.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017) (“The Human Rights 
Commission interprets the law to require that an individual be permitted to access restrooms 
in accordance with his/her gender identity, rather than his/her assigned sex at birth.”); A 
Guide to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and the Washington State Laws Against 
Discrimination, Washington State Human Rights Commission, available at http://www. 
humwa.gov/media/dynamic/files/162_Updated%20SO%20GI%20Guide.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2017) (“If an employer maintains gender-specific restrooms, transgender 
employees should be permitted to use the restroom that is consistent with the individual’s 
gender identity.”).  
 19. A.B. 1266, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ca. 2013) (enacted). 
 20. Id. (emphasis added.); see also, Emeline Garcia, Note, AB 1266: The School Success 
and Opportunity Act or a Violation of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 35 U. LA VERNE 
L. REV. 243 (2004). 
 21. Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code §12940. 
 22. See id. 
3 - FLEMMING_MACRO_REDLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2018  4:22 PM 
162 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:2 
Housing issued guidance for California employers.23  A press release made 
it “clear that employers must allow transgender employees access to 
bathrooms, showers, locker rooms and other such facilities that correspond 
with their gender identity.”24 
Similarly, Colorado provides both transgender students as well as 
employees with the right to use public bathrooms or facilities based on 
their gender identity in S.B. O8-200.25  The Colorado general assembly 
enacted the law to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
including transgender status.26  Thereafter, the Colorado Association of 
School Boards, the Colorado Association of School Executives, the 
Colorado Education Association, and One Colorado27 collaborated to 
devise a document entitled Guidance for Educators Working with 
Transgender and Gender NonConforming Students stating that the 
“preferred practice is to allow students access to the bathroom or locker 
room that corresponds to their gender identity consistently asserted at 
school.”28  
Additionally, Rule 81.11 of the Colorado Code of Regulation required 
employers to allow transgender employees to use the bathroom based on 
their gender identity.29  In part, the law states that: “All covered entities 
shall allow individuals the use of gender segregated facilities that are 
consistent with their gender identity” and “[g]ender segregated facilities 




 23. See California Department of Fair Housing & Employment February 17, 2016, News 
Release, supra note 19. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, S.B. 08-200, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Co. 2008)(enacted) 
 26. Id. 
 27. “One Colorado is the state’s leading advocacy organization dedicated to advancing 
equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) Coloradans and their 
families.”  ABOUT US, ONE COLORADO.ORG, available at http://www.one-colorado.org/ 
about-us/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 28. This guidance specifically, stated that in schools the “preferred practice is to allow 
students access to the restroom or locker room that corresponds to their gender identity 
consistently asserted at school.”  The school, in determining a student’s access to restroom, 
is advised to consider the following factors: (1) the student’s age; (2) the student’s 
preferences (including his or her need or desire for privacy); (3) any relevant medical needs; 
(4) the location of facilities in proximity to the student’s classes and schedule; (5) the design 
and layout of the facilities; (7) the age and nature of the other students; (8) the student’s 
maturity level; and (9) behavior or disciplinary history.  See Guidance for Educators 
Working with Transgender and Gender NonConforming Students, available at https://cdpsd 
ocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Resources/One%20Colorado/OneCO%20Transgender_Guidance
.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
 29. §3 CCR 708-1 of Colorado Civil Rights Commission Rules and Regulation Rule 
81.11.  
 30. See supra note 29.  
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B. STATE-ENACTED BIOLOGY-BASED LAWS  
Conversely, between 2013 and 2017, approximately twenty-four states 
considered enacting transgender bathroom laws to restrict the use of public 
bathrooms to the individual’s biological sex.31  Interestingly, Colorado is 
on this list, notwithstanding the state’s 2008 legislation.32  A biology-based 
transgender bathroom bill was introduced into the Colorado state 
legislature in 2015.33  However, like the fate of similar bills proposed in 
other states, the Colorado bill died in committee by a vote of 7 to 4.34  
Like Colorado, other states have considered enacting biology-based 
transgender bathroom legislation. The states of Arizona, Florida, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin are among those possibly motivated by gallant 
intent.35  Proponents of these laws argue that the public’s safety is at risk 
 
 31. Bathroom Bill Legislation: Overview of State Legislation, National Conference of 
State Legislatures, Aug. 30, 2016, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-
bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 32. See H.B. 15-1081, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., (Co. 2015) (“Notwithstanding 
any other provisions of this section, it is not a discriminatory practice for a person to restrict 
admission to a place of public accommodation to individuals of one sex if: . . . the place of 
public accommodation is a sex-segregated locker room and the restriction is based on an 
individual’s actual, biological sex.”); see also, Joey Bunch, Locker Room Privacy Bill 
Called Unfair to Transgender People Dies, DENVER POST, Feb. 4, 2015, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/2015/02/04/locker-room-privacy-bill-called-unfair-totransgende 
r-people-dies/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See S.B. 1045, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Az. 2013) (introduced); H.B. 583, Leg., 
Reg. Sess, (Fl. 2015) (died in judiciary committee) (“Single-sex public facilities designated 
for females shall be restricted to females. . . .  Single-sex public facilities designated for 
males shall be restricted to males.”); H.B. 4474, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Il. 2016) 
(session sine die)(“Requires a school board to designate each pupil restroom, changing 
room, or overnight facility accessible by multiple pupils simultaneously, whether located in 
a public school building or located in a facility utilized by the school for a school-sponsored 
activity, for the exclusive use of pupils of only one sex. Defines “sex” as the physical 
condition of being male or female, as determined by an individual’s chromosomes and 
identified at birth by that individual’s anatomy.”); H.B. 1079, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (In. 
2016) (as introduced by Rep. Timothy Harman) (Single sex facility trespass. Makes it a 
Class B misdemeanor if: (1) a male knowingly or intentionally enters a single sex facility 
that is designated to be used only by females; or (2) a female knowingly or intentionally 
enters a single sex facility that is designated to be used only by males.); S.B. 35, 119th Gen. 
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (In. 2016) (introduced) (“Single sex facilities. Provides that 
student facilities in school buildings must be designated for use by female students or male 
students, and may be used only by the students of the biological gender for which the 
facility is designated. Makes it a Class A misdemeanor if: (1) a male knowingly or 
intentionally enters a single sex public facility that is designed to be used by females; or (2) 
a female knowingly or intentionally enters a single sex public facility that is designed to be 
used by males.”); H.B. 2737, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016)(died in committee) 
(created the student physical privacy act and providing, among other things, that “[i]n all 
public schools and postsecondary educational institutions in this state, student restrooms, 
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locker rooms and showers that are designated for one sex shall be used only by members of 
that sex.  “Sex means the physical condition of being male or female, which is determined 
by a person’s chromosomes, and is identified at birth by a person’s anatomy.”); S.B. 513, 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee) (created the student physical 
privacy act); H.B. 364, Gen. Assemb., 16 Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2016) (introduced) (Created “new 
sections of KRS Chapter 158 to ensure that student privacy exists in school restrooms, 
locker rooms, and showers; require students born male to use only those facilities designated 
to be used by males and students born female to use only those facilities designated to be 
used by females”); H.B. 542, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (La. 2016) (introduced) (stating that 
“[e]mployers may designate restrooms based on sex and may restrict the use of such 
facilities to only those employees, contract workers, customers, and visitors whose sex 
designated at birth corresponds to the designation of the restroom” and the term “[s]ex 
means the sex assigned to a person at birth.”); H.B. 1320, 189th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 
(Ma. 2015) (“Access to lawfully sex-segregated facilities, accommodations, resorts, and 
amusements, as well as educational, athletic, and therapeutic activities and programs, shall 
be controlled by an individual’s anatomical sex of male or female, regardless of that 
individual’s gender identity.”); H.B. 5717, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 2016) 
(introduced) (“A bill to restrict the use of public bathrooms, changing  facilities, and similar 
shared spaces used for private activities based on biological sex.” . . . “‘Biological sex’” 
means physical condition of being male or female, as stated on the individual’s birth 
certificate or a state-issued identification card.”); S.B. 993, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 
2016)(introduced) (“A restroom, locker room or shower that is located in an elementary or 
secondary school under the control of the board or board of directors, is designated for pupil 
use, and is accessible by multiple pupils at the same time shall be designated for and used 
only by pupils of the same biological sex.” . . . “As used in this section, ‘biological sex’ 
means the physical condition of being male or female as determined by a person’s 
chromosomes and anatomy as identified at birth.”); H.F. 3396, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mn. 
2016) (introduced) (“Other than single-occupancy facilities, no employer shall permit access 
to restrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and other similar places on any basis other than 
biological sex.”); S.F. 3002, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Mn. 2016) (introduced) (“Other than 
single-occupancy facilities, no employer shall permit access to restrooms, locker rooms, 
dressing rooms, and other similar places on any basis other than biological sex.”); H.B. 
1258, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ms. 2016) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
it shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly and intentionally enter into restroom facilities 
or other bath facilities that were designed for use by the gender opposite the person’s gender 
at birth.”); H.B. 1847, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) (“All public 
restrooms, other than single occupancy restrooms, shall be designated as gender-divided 
restrooms.”); H.B. 2303, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) (“No student of 
the female sex shall use a student bathroom or student changing room that has been 
designated by the school district for the exclusive use of the male sex, and no student of the 
male sex shall use a student bathroom or student changing room that has been designated by 
the school district for the exclusive use of the female sex.” The term “sex” under this bill is 
defined as “the physical condition of being male or female, as identified at birth by an 
individual’s anatomy.”); S.B. 720, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) (“Every 
public school restroom, locker room and shower room designated for student use and which 
is accessible by multiple students at the same time shall be designated for and used only by 
students of the same biological sex.”  The term “biological sex” under the bill is defined as 
“the physical condition of being male or female, which is determined by a person’s 
chromosomes, and is identified at birth by a person’s anatomy and indicated on their birth 
certificate.”); A.B. 375, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Nov. 2015) (a bill requiring “any school 
facility in a public school, including a restroom, locker or shower which is designated for 
use by persons of one biological sex must only be used by persons of that biological sex as 
determined at birth.”); S.B. A10127, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2016) (introduced) 
(“The board of trustees of the state university of New York and the trustees of the city 
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university of New York are authorized to promulgate rules or policies requiring every state 
university of New York and city university of New York, including all their constituent 
units including community colleges, to ensure that  multiple occupancy bathrooms or 
changing facilities that are designated for use, be designated for and used only by persons 
based on their biological sex.  For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply: 
(a) ‘Biological  sex’ shall mean the physical condition of being male or female, which is 
stated on a person’s birth certificate.”); H.B.2, Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., (N.C. 2016) 
(repealed) (“An Act to Provide for Singe Occupancy Bathroom and Changing Facilities in 
Schools and Public Agencies and Create Consistency in Regulation of Employment and 
Public Accommodations.”); S.B. 1014, 55th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., (Ok. 2016) (introduced) 
(“It shall be unlawful for a person to use a gender specific restroom when that person’s 
biological gender is contrary to that of the gender); H.B.1008, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 
(S.D. 2016) (vetoed) (“Every restroom, locker room, and shower room located in a public 
elementary or secondary school that is designated for student use and is accessible by 
multiple students at the same time shall be designated for and used only by students of the 
same biological sex.  In addition, any public school student participating in a school 
sponsored activity off school premises which includes being in a state of undress in the 
presence of other students shall use those rooms designated for and used only by students of 
the same biological sex.”  The term “biological sex” under this bill “means the physical 
condition of being male or female as determined by a person’s chromosomes and identified 
at birth by a person’s anatomy.”); H.B. 2414, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Tn. 2016) 
(died in chamber) (“Public schools shall require that a student use student restroom and 
locker room facilities that are assigned for use by persons of the same sex as the sex 
indicated on the student’s original birth certificate. . . .  Public institutions of higher 
education shall require that a student use the restroom and locker room facilities that are 
assigned for use by persons of the same sex as the sex indicated on the student’s original 
birth certificate.”); H.B. 663, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Va. 2016) (failed) (“The Director 
of the Department shall develop and implement policies that require every restroom 
designated for public use in any public building on property that is owned, leased, or 
controlled by the Commonwealth . . . and that is designated for use by a specific gender to 
solely be used by individuals whose anatomical sex matches such gender designation. . . . 
Local school boards shall develop and implement policies that require every school 
restroom, locker room, or shower room that is designated for use by a specific gender to 
solely be used by individuals whose anatomical sex matches such gender designation.”  The 
term anatomical sex under this bill “means the physical condition of being male or female, 
which is determined by a person’s anatomy.”); H.B. 781, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Va. 
2016) (defeated) (a bill titled Restroom facilities; use of facilities in public buildings or 
schools, definition of biological sex.); H.B. 2589, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2016) 
(introduced) (“Nothing in this chapter prohibits a public or private entity from limiting 
access to a private facility segregated by gender, such as a bathroom, restroom, toilet, 
shower, locker room, or sauna, to a person if the person is preoperative, nonoperative, or 
otherwise has genitalia of a different gender from that for which the facility is segregated.  
Nothing in this chapter grants any right to a person to access a private facility segregated by 
gender, such as a bathroom, restroom, toilet, shower, locker room, or sauna, of a public or 
private entity if the person is preoperative, nonoperative, or otherwise has genitalia of a 
different gender from that for which the facility is segregated.”); H.B. 2782, 64th Leg., Reg. 
Sess., (Wa. 2016) (introduced) (“This act may be known and cited as the Washington 
gender privacy protection act.”); H.B. 2941, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2016) (introduced) 
(“Schools must provide toilets and restroom facilities for each sex with no disparities based 
on sex.  Each school must provide facilities to be used separately by each sex. Schools may 
provide a gender-neutral single occupant bathroom to accommodate a student’s privacy 
concerns.  “Sex” as used in this section means biological sex or sex assigned at birth.”); S.B. 
6548, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2016) (introduced) (“AN ACT Relating to allowing the 
use of gender-segregated facilities”); A.B. 469, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wi. 2015) (failed 
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when transgender individuals are allowed to use the bathroom based on 
their gender identity.36  Specifically their argument suggests that men, 
disguised as women, would intentionally invade the women’s bathroom 
with the ultimate purpose of raping women.37  Conversely, opponents of 
biology-based laws argue that the laws unlawfully discriminate against 
transgender individuals.38 
Among states, biology-based bathroom laws are by no means generic 
in language. Some proposed laws were restricted to secondary and post-
secondary schools only.39  For example, in Kansas, the legislature, through 
House Bill 2737 and Senate Bill 513, proposed creating “the student 
physical privacy act.”40  Specifically, these bills provided that: “In all 
public schools and postsecondary educational institutions in this state, 
student bathrooms, locker rooms and showers that are designated for one 
sex shall be used only by members of that sex.”41  And, the term “sex" 
under these bills “means the physical condition of being male or female, 
which is determined by a person's chromosomes, and is identified at birth 
by a person's anatomy.”42  Furthermore, the bill gave a student the right to 
sue the school for monetary damages if the school gave a person of the 
opposite sex “permission to use the facilities of a different sex or the school 
 
to pass) (“This bill requires a school board to designate each pupil restroom and changing 
room (together, changing room) located in a public school building and accessible by 
multiple pupils as for the exclusive use of pupils of only one sex.  The bill defines ‘sex’ as 
the physical condition of being male or female, as determined by an individual’s 
chromosomes and identified at birth by that individual’s anatomy.”); S.B. 582, Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Wi. 2015) (failed to pass) (“This bill requires a school board to 
designate each pupil restroom and changing room (together, changing room) located in a 
public school building and accessible by multiple pupils as for the exclusive use of pupils of 
only one sex.  The bill defines ‘sex’ as the physical condition of being male or female, as 
determined by an individual’s reproductive organs and as designated on that individual’s 
birth certificate.”). 
 36.  See Erin Beck, Transgender Predator Myth Affects Lives in W.Va., CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE-MAIL, pg. P1B, May 8, 2016 (“if cities and states pass laws that ban 
discrimination in public places rapist will put on dresses, sneak into women’s restrooms, 
and assault women and children); see also, Jeff Brady, When a Transgender Person Uses 
the Restroom Who is at Risk?, NPR, May 15, 2016, available at http://www.npr.org/2016 
/05/15/477954537/when-a-transgender-person-uses-a-public-bathroom-who-is-at-risk (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
 37. See Beck, supra note 37.  
 38. See Katy Steinmetz, Everything You Need to Know About the Debate Over 
Transgender People and Bathrooms, TIME, July 28, 2015, available at http://time.com/3974 
186/transgender-bathroom-debate/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017); see also, Brady supra note 37. 
 39. See e.g. H.B. 2737, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee); S.B. 
513, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee); H.B. 364, Gen. Assemb., 16 
Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2016) (introduced); H.B. 5717, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 2016) 
(introduced); S.B. 993, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mi. 2016) (introduced); S.B. A10127, 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2016) (introduced). 
 40. H.B. 2737, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee); S.B. 513, Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ks. 2016) (died in committee). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See supra note 40.  
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failed “to take reasonable steps to prohibit such use.”43  Both of these bills, 
however, failed to pass and died in committee on June 1, 2016.44 
Other contemplated transgender bathroom laws were intended to 
govern public employees within a state.45  For example, Louisiana House 
Bill 542, pre-filed46 with the Louisiana House of Representatives on March 
3, 2016, was drafted to provide rights for employers on issues regarding 
transgender individuals.47  The bill stated that “[e]mployers may designate 
bathrooms based on sex and may restrict the use of such facilities to only 
those employees, contract workers, customers, and visitors whose sex 
designated at birth corresponds to the designation of the bathroom.”48  The 
bill was withdrawn the next day and never reached the House.49 
Comparably, South Carolina’s Senate Bill 1203, introduced into the 
state’s senate on April 6, 2016, provided that “[m]ultiple occupancy 
bathrooms and changing facilities located on public property, including but 
not limited to property owned by the State, its authorities, commissions, 
departments, committees or agencies, or any political subdivision of the 
State, shall be designated for and only used by a person based on his 
biological sex.”50  As stated, this bill would encompass both public 
employers and public schools.51  The bill was referred to the General 
Committee on the same day that it was introduced.  It had not been enacted 
as of October 2017.52 
Other states have gone a step further by proposing to criminalize the 
use of public bathrooms if used by someone inconsistent with his or her 
biological sex.53  Notably, Indiana’s House Bill 1079 was introduced in the 
state’s House of Representatives on January 5, 2016, and proposed to make 
it a “Class B misdemeanor if: (1) a male knowingly or intentionally enters a 
single sex facility that is designated to be used only by females; or (2) a 
female knowingly or intentionally enters a single sex facility that is 
designated to be used only by males.”54  This bill, like those proposed in 
 
 43. Id.  
 44. See id.  
 45. See e.g., H.B. 542, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (La. 2016) (introduced); G.B. 1203, 
121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2016) (introduced).  
 46. The term prefile has been defined as “the ability to introduce a measure before the 
opening of the session.” Glossary of Legislative Terms, National Conference of State 
Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/glossary-of-
legislative-terms.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
 47. See, H.B. 542, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (La. 2016) (introduced). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. G.B. 1203, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (S.C. 2016) (introduced).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See e.g., H.B. 1079, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (In. 2016) (as introduced by Rep. 
Timothy Harman); H.B. 1258, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ms. 2016). 
 54. H.B. 1079, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (In. 2016) (as introduced by Rep. Timothy 
Harman). 
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other state legislations before it, failed to pass.55 
Likewise, Mississippi’s House Bill 1258 stated: “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this section, it shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly and 
intentionally enter into bathroom facilities or other bath facilities that were 
designed for use by the gender opposite the person's gender at birth.”56  
And, anyone found in violation of the provisions was subject to 
prosecution.57  The law failed to pass on February 23, 2016.  Refusing to be 
crushed by this defeat, in April 2016, the state passed a law specifically 
defining a man and a woman based on the “individual’s immutable 
biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at the 
time of birth.”58  Three months after this law was enacted, a federal judge 
struck it down.59 
1. North Carolina’s Biology-Based Transgender Bathroom Law 
Despite the numerous states that have contemplated enacting biology-
based transgender bathroom laws, currently the only state to have actually 
enacted such a law is North Carolina.60  On March 23, 2016, former 
Governor Pat McCrory signed into law the Public Facilities Privacy & 
Security Act, commonly known as House Bill 2 (“HB-2”).61 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. H.B. 1258, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ms. 2016) 
 57. Id. 
 58. See H.B. 1523, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ms. 2016).; see also, Emma Green, 
America’s Profound Gender Anxiety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 31, 2016, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/americas-profound-gender-anxiety/484 
856/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2017); Avianne Tann, Mississippi Religious Freedom Bill, ABC 
News, Apr. 6, 2016, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/mississippis-religious-freedom-
bill-sweeping-anti-lgbt-law/story?id=38170420 (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).; Neely Tucker, 
U.S. District Judge Strikes Down Mississippi’s Religious Freedom Law, WASH. POST, July 
1, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/us-district-judge-strik 
es-down-mississippis-religious-freedom-law/2016/07/01/f98dc2ca-3ec9-11e6-a66faa6c1883 
b6b1_story.html?utm_term=.f176c9772cd2 (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
 59. Id. 
 60. H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., 2016-3 (N.C. 2016); see also, Carcaño v. 
McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2016). 
 61. In November 2014, almost two years before this law was enacted, the Charlotte, 
North Carolina, City Council began considering a proposal to amend the city’s 
nondiscrimination ordinances to prevent discrimination on the basis of “marital status, 
family status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression.”  Approximately, 
four months later, on March 2, 2015, the proposed ordinance was modified to include the 
following language: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, this section shall not, with regard to 
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression, apply to restrooms, locker 
rooms, showers, and changing facilities.”  However, the proposed ordinance failed to pass 
by a vote of six to five.  Thereafter, in February 2016, the Charlotte City Council considered 
a new proposal to its nondiscrimination ordinance, which added “marital status, familial 
status, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression” to the list of protected 
characteristics.  But, this time the proposed ordinance did not contain exceptions for 
bathrooms, showers or other similar facilities and it repealed prior rules that exempted 
“‘restrooms, showers rooms, bathrooms and similar facilities.”  This newly proposed 
ordinance, which “regulated places of public accommodation and businesses seeking to 
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HB-2 targeted government agencies within the state by specifically 
providing that: “‘Public agencies’ shall require every multiple occupancy 
bathroom or changing facility to be designated for and only used by 
persons based on their biological sex.”62  And, the term “biological sex” 
was defined under the law as “the physical condition of being male or 
female, which is stated on  a person’s birth certificate.”63  In effect, this bill 
prevented all public agencies from allowing transgender individuals to use 
public bathrooms that are consistent with their gender identity.64  The term 
public agencies included (1) “[a]ll agencies, boards, offices, and 
departments under the direction and control of a member of the Council of 
State”; (2) “[a] local board of education”; (3) “[t]he judicial branch”; (4) 
“[t]he legislative branch”; and (5) “[a]ny other political subdivision of the 
State.”65  Clearly and purposefully, North Carolina’s HB-2 was enacted to 
directly affect the lives of both transgender students attending public 
institutions in North Carolina and transgender employees working for the 
state.66 
HB-2, however, had a much deeper impact because it provides that 
“the regulation of discriminatory practices in places of public 
accommodation is properly an issue of general, statewide concern, such 
that this Article and other applicable provisions of the General Statutes 
supersede and preempt any ordinance, regulation, resolution, or policy 
adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other political 
subdivision of the State.”67  In essence, through HB-2, the state legislature 
vested itself with sole authority to regulate on matters related to 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.  Local and state 
agencies were stripped of their ability to regulate—as many had previously 
done—or to override the state law on this matter.68 
Following the enactment of HB-2 and in response to it, Margaret 
Spellings, the President of the University of North Carolina (“UNC”) 
system, sent a memorandum to all of its Chancellors indicating that 
“University institutions must require every multiple-occupancy bathroom 
and changing facility to be designated for and used only by persons based 
 
contract with Charlotte,’ passed by a vote of seven to four.  After the adoption of Charlotte’s 
new ordinance, the North Carolina General Assembly, who was not scheduled to reconvene 
until April 25, 2016, convened a special session one month early to vote on HB-2.  The 
same day that the special session was convened the law passed the House by a vote of 
eighty-four to twenty-five; passed the Senate with all Republicans unanimous supporting the 
law while the Democrats walked out in protest; and was signed into law by the governor. 
H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., 2016-3 (N.C. 2016); see also, Carcaño v. McCrory, 
203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2016). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., 2nd Extra Sess., 2016-3 (N.C. 2016). 
 66. H.R. 2 Gen. Assemb., supra note 65. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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on their biological sex.”69 
Shortly thereafter, on May 4, 2016, a little over a month after North 
Carolina enacted HB-2, the United States Department of Justice sent a 
letter to former Governor McCrory indicating that North Carolina’s law 
violated, among other things, Title IX and Title VII.70  The letter indicated 
that through compliance and implementation of the law, North Carolina “is 
engaging in a pattern and practice of discrimination against transgender 
state employees.”71  On the same day, the Department of Justice also sent a 
letter to Spellings reiterating that HB-2 was illegal and stating that, as a 
recipient of federal financial assistance, the UNC system must comply with 
Title IX, and, as an employer, the system must comply with Title VII.72  
Both letters gave the respective recipients until May 9, 2016, to remedy the 
situation.73 
Rather than complying with the Department of Justice’s request, North 
Carolina filed a lawsuit against the federal government on May 9th, 
requesting that the court declare HB-2 legal.74  The lawsuit was filed in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.75 In 
response, and in a different district court, the Department of Justice filed a 
similar lawsuit against North Carolina, challenging the legality of HB-2.  
Its petition was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of North Carolina.76  Subsequently, on September 16, 2016, North 
Carolina dismissed its lawsuit against the federal government citing 
“substantial costs to the State.”77 
In addition to the federal lawsuit filed by the Justice Department, an 
 
 69. See Memorandum from Margaret Spellings on Compliance with the Public Facilities 
Privacy & Security Act to Chancellors (Apr. 5, 2016), available at https://www.northcaroli 
na.edu/sites/default/files/public_facilities_guidance_memo_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 70. See Letter from U.S. Department of Justice to Governor Pat McCrory (May 4, 2016), 
available at http://media.charlotteobserver.com/static/images/misc/HB2050412.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 71. See supra note 71.  
 72. See Letter from U.S. Department of Justice to President Margaret Spellings, Thomas 
C. Shanahan & University of North Carolina Board of Governors (May 4, 2016), available 
at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article75647942.ece/BINA 
RY/Read:%20DOJ%20letter%20to%20UNC (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).  
 73. See id. 
 74. See McCrory v. U.S., No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. filed May 9, 2016) available 
at http://media2.newsobserver.com/content/media/2016/5/9/Complaint%20McCrory%20V 
%20USA.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2017). 
 75. See id.  
 76. See U.S. v. State of N.C., No. 5:16-cv-00238-BO (E.D.N.C. filed May 9, 2016) 
dismissed; available at http://media2.newsobserver.com/content/media/2016/5/9/Complai 
nt%20McCrory%20V%20USA.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 77. See Rebecca Hersher, North Carolina Governor Drops Bathroom Lawsuit Against 
U.S., NPR, Sept. 19. 2016, available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/19 
/494573314/north-carolina-governor-drops-bathroom-bill-lawsuit-against-u-s (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2017); see also, McCrory Drops House Bill 2 Lawsuit, Cites Costs, ABC11.COM, 
Sept. 18, 2016, available at http://abc11.com/politics/mccrory-drops-house-bill-2-lawsuit-
cites-costs/1516428/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
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action was brought against the state in the case of Carcano v. McCrory.  In 
Carcano, North Carolina was sued by several transgender plaintiffs, 
including two transgender students and one employee, alleging that HB-2 
violated: (1) Title VII, (2) Title IX, (3) the Due Process Clause and (4) the 
Equal Protection Clause.78  Additionally, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of HB-2 until their 
lawsuit was settled.79  The lawsuit was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.  In August 2016, the 
federal judge granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, 
thereby blocking the enforcement of HB-2 while their lawsuit was 
ongoing.80 
As a result of HB-2, the state had to brace itself against the strong 
waves of negative backlash.  Corporations and celebrities boycotted the 
state.81  PayPal canceled its decision to open an office in the state.82  
Deutcsche Bank abandoned its plans to add hundreds of new jobs in the 
state.83  The National Basketball Association and the National College 
Athletic Association decided to move their sports games, traditionally 
scheduled and played in North Carolina, to venues outside the state.84 
 
 78. Carcaño v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. June 6, 2016). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 622–23. (“After careful consideration of the limited record presented thus far, 
the court concludes that the individual transgender Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that 
(1) they are likely to succeed on their claim that Part I violates Title IX, as interpreted by the 
United States Department of Education (“DOE”) under the standard articulated by the 
Fourth Circuit; (2) they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) 
the balance of equities weighs in favor of an injunction; and (4) an injunction is in the public 
interest.”); see also, Corinne Segal, UNC cannot Enforce Part of HB-2, Federal Judge 
Rules, PBS, Aug. 27, 2016, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/transgend 
er-unc-hb-2-injunction/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“A federal judge has blocked the 
University of North Carolina from enforcing part of the state’s recent law that limits 
bathroom use by transgender people, adding that the plaintiffs “are likely to succeed on their 
claim” that the law is discriminatory.”). 
 81. See Amber Phillips, The Legal Effect of North Carolina’s Transgender Bathroom 
Law in 4 Questions, WASH. POST, May 9, 2016, available at https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/09/the-legal-fight-over-north-carolinas-transgender-bath 
room-law-explained-in-4-questions/, (last visited July 28, 2016). 
 82. See, Paypal Withdraws Plans for Charlotte Expansion over HB2, THE CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Apr. 5, 2016, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business 
/article70001502.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); citing HB2, Paypal Cancels Planned 
Charlotte Expansion, WRAL, Apr. 5, 2016, available at http://www.wral.com/citing-hb2-
paypal-cancels-planned-charlotte-expansion/15621787/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2107). 
 83. See Steven Benen, NCAA Joins Backlash Against North Carolina’s Anti-LGBT Law, 
MSNBC, Sept. 13, 2016, available at http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/ncaa-
joins-backlash-against-north-carolinas-anti-lgbt-law (last visited Oct. 7, 2017) (“[NCAA 
officials] announced on Monday evening that they will relocate all of their championship 
events scheduled to take place in North Carolina due to the controversial HB2 law. . .”); see 
also, Scott Jaschik, NCAA Moves Championship from North Carolina, INSIDE HIGHER ED, 
Sept. 13, 2016, available at https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/09/13/ncaa-will-
move-championship-games-north-carolina (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 84. See Emma Margolin, NBA Pulls All-Star Game Out of Charlotte, NBC NEWS, July 
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In an attempt to diminish the negative impact of HB-2, on March 20, 
2017, North Carolina’s newly elected governor, Governor Roy Cooper, 
signed into law House Bill 142 (“HB-142), commonly referred to as a 
“compromise bill”, which repealed some parts of HB-2.85  Specifically, 
HB-142 repealed the provision of HB-2 that required individuals to use 
public bathrooms or facilities based on their biological sex.86  However, 
HB-142 retained, until December 2020, the portion of HB-2 that prohibited 
state agencies and local governments from regulating, on their own, access 
to multiple occupancy bathrooms and facilities.87  That authority remained 
with the state legislature, thereby paralyzing the authority of state agencies 
and local governments to regulate on this matter.  
III. LEGAL CASES EXAMINING BIOLOGICAL-BASED LAWS  
 
When states enact transgender bathroom laws based on a student’s or 
an employee’s biological sex, legal questions arise under federal law; are 
the biology-based transgender bathroom laws discriminatory?88  Plaintiffs 
 
21, 2016, available at http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/nba-pulls-all-star-gameou 
tcharlotte-over-hb2-n614466 (last visited Oct. 7, 2017); see also, Marc Tracy & Alan 
Blinder, N.C.A.A. Moves Championship Events from North Carolina, Cites Anti-Gay-Rights 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/sports/ 
ncaa-moves-championship-events-from-north-carolina.html?r=0 (last visited Oct. 7, 2017); 
Scott Cacciola & Alan Blinder, N.B.A. to Move All-Star Game from North Carolina, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/sports/basketball/n 
ba-all-star-game-moves-charlotte-transgender-bathroom-law.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2017). 
 85. In November 2016, Democrat candidate Roy Cooper won the North Carolina 
gubernatorial election and beat the incumbent Republican candidate Pat McCory.  See North 
Carolina Gov. McCory Concedes Governor’s Race, CBS NEWS, Dec. 5, 2016, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pat-mccrory-north-carolina-governor-concedes-roy-cooper/ 
(last visited on July 26, 2017); see also, H.R. 142 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.C. 2017) 
[hereinafter North Carolina House Bill 142]; see also, Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott 
C. McLaughlin, North Carolina Repeals Bathroom Bill, CNN, Mar. 30, 2017, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/ (last visited July 
19, 2017) (“North Carolina lawmakers on Thursday passed a bill that repeals the state’s 
controversial bathroom law in a move meant to end a year of tumult that saw businesses 
leave and major sporting events and concerts canceled.”); Daniella Silva, HB2 Repeal: 
North Carolina Overturns Controversial ‘Bathroom Bill’, NBCNEWS, Apr. 2, 2017, 
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/hb2-repeal-north-carolina-legislature-
votes-overturn-controversial-bathroom-bill-n740546 (last visited July 19, 2017) (“A deal 
that North Carolina lawmakers reached to repeal the state’s controversial and costly 
‘bathroom bill’ passed on Thursday after a contentious debate—but the compromise has left 
LGBTQ advocates exasperated, with some calling it ‘shameful’ and an ‘outrageous 
betrayal.’”). 
 86. See North Carolina House Bill 142, supra note 86. 
 87. See id.; see also, Hanna, Park & McLaughlin, supra note 86 (“LGBTQ and civil 
rights advocates have called for a full repeal of the bill, and denounced the new compromise 
over provisions they say will still allow for discrimination: namely a three-year ban on local 
nondiscrimination ordinances.”). 
 88. While scope of this article is limited to federal claims, it should be noted that there 
have been a small number of cases instituted against schools and employers based on state 
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commonly assert that the law violates either Title IX and/or Title VII.89 
A. THE TITLE IX CLAIM- EDUCATION 
Title IX provides that “[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”90  The law forbids discrimination by educational 
institutions based on certain characteristics, such as sex.91  To allege a 
violation of Title IX based on sex discrimination, the plaintiff must show 
that: (1) he or she was excluded from participation in an education program 
because of his or her sex; (2) the educational institution was receiving 
federal financial assistance at the time of his or her exclusion; and (3) that 
the improper discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.92  A review of two 
federal cases highlights the issue. 
1.  Johnston v. University of Pittsburg of the Commonwealth System of 
Higher Education 
The issue of whether Title IX is violated when a transgender student is 
denied the right to use the bathroom because of a biology-based policy was 
raised in the case of Johnston v. University of Pittsburg of the 
 
claims for biology-based transgender bathroom laws implemented for students and 
employees.  The state cases have focused on whether these biology-based transgender 
bathroom laws violate state statutes prohibiting discrimination against individuals based on 
their gender identity or expression.  See e.g., Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d at 603; Mathis v. 
Fountain Fort Carson School District 8, No. P20130034X at 10–11 (Colo. Div. of Civil 
Rights June 17, 2013), available at http://www.transgenderlegal.org/media/uploads/d 
oc529.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (the Colorado Civil Rights Division held that a school 
discriminated against a transgender female student when it denied her the right to use the 
girl’s restroom); Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 717; cf. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the 
Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (After granting a 
university’s motion to dismiss on federal claims, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over a transgender student’s state claim that a university violated his rights under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act by prohibiting him from using the male restroom.); 
Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1015 (D. Nev., Oct. 4, 2016) 
(holding that the employer actions of banning a transgender employee from the men’s and 
women’s restroom violated Nevada’s Anti-Discrimination Statute codified as N.R.S. 
613.330, which prevents discrimination based on gender identity). 
 89. It should also be noted that when a transgender student or employee is denied the 
right to use the restroom based on his or her gender identity, this individual may also choose 
to bring an equal protection claim or a due process claim.  See e.g., Johnston, 97 F.Supp.3d 
at 672 (holding that a transgender student who was denied the right to use the restroom 
based on his gender identity failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Carcano v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 
615 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (a case where students and a faculty member brought equal 
protection and due process claims after being denied the right to use the restroom based on 
their gender identity). 
 90. 20 U.S.C.S §1681(a).   
 91. Id. 
 92. Cannon v. University of Chicago et al., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979). 
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Commonwealth System of Higher Education.93  In Johnston, the plaintiff, 
Seamus Johnston, born biologically female, understood his gender identity 
as a male at the early age of nine.94  In May 2009, Seamus transitioned 
completely from female to male by holding himself out as a male in all 
parts of his life including: (1) amending his gender marker to male on his 
Pennsylvania license; (2) changing his name to a male name; (3) registering 
with the Selective Service; (4) amending the gender marker on his United 
States passport to male; and (5) amending the gender marker to male on his 
Social Security record.95 
From 2009 to 2011, Seamus attended the University of Pittsburgh at 
Johnstown as an undergraduate Computer Science major.96  Although in 
March 2009, on his application for enrollment at the university, he listed 
his sex as female,97 during his entire tenure at the university Seamus held 
himself out as a male.  In August 2011, Seamus requested that the 
university change the gender marker to male on his school records.98  
While enrolled at the university, he consistently used the men’s bathroom 
on campus and even registered for a men’s weight training class during the 
spring 2011 semester.99  As a student in this class, he used the men’s locker 
room.100   
In September 2011, a university official informed Seamus that he could 
no longer use the men’s locker room without a court order or a new birth 
certificate reflecting his gender as a male.101  Nonetheless, Seamus 
continued to use both the men’s bathroom and locker room, and after 
receiving several citations, on December 2, 2011, the university held a 
disciplinary hearing.102  At the hearing, Seamus was sanctioned and found 
guilty of violating the student code of conduct.103  Despite these sanctions, 
Seamus continued to use the men’s facilities. Subsequently, he was 
expelled from the school, and later filed a lawsuit against the university.104 
In his complaint, Seamus asserted that the university discriminated 
against him in violation of Title IX “because of his sex, including his 
transgender status and his perceived failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes.”105  The university’s response asserted that Seamus failed to 
state a cognizable action because Title IX does not prevent discrimination 
 
 93. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 (2015). 
 94. Id. at 662. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 662–63. 
 99. Id. at 663. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 664. 
 103. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 664. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 672. 
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on the basis of gender identity.106  To support their position, the university 
cited Title IX, which it claims does not mention gender identity, gender 
expression, or gender transition.107  Additionally, the university argued that 
Seamus’s allegations did not constitute sex stereotyping, which, if proven, 
would render the university’s action discriminatory.108 
The court in Johnston agreed with the university and determined that 
Seamus failed to state a cognizable claim for discrimination under Title 
IX.109  In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the university’s 
policy that required students to use sex-segregated bathrooms and locker 
rooms based on their biological sex, did not violate Title IX’s prohibition 
against sex discrimination.110  The court reached this finding 
notwithstanding the fact that it cited no federal court cases where this 
specific issue was addressed.111  Instead, the court relied on federal court 
decisions that had traditionally held that transgender status is not a 
protected characteristic under Title VII.112  Namely, the Johnston court 
cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., in which the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that the term “sex” in Title VII should be given the traditional definition of 
male and female, rather than an expansive meaning which would include 
transgender status.113  Influenced by the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the court 
in Johnston concluded that Title IX does not provide protection for 
transgender status.114 
Next, the court in Johnston addressed Seamus’ claim that the university 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.; see also, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 109. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 672. 
 110. Id. at 672–73. 
 111. Id. at 674. 
 112. Id. at 672 (citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 
2007) (denying a transgender employee’s Title VII claim)); see also, Ulane v. E. Airlines, 
742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (“While we do not condone discrimination in any form, 
we are constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals.”); Sommers v. 
Budget Marketing, Inc. 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Because Congress has not 
shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based on one’s 
transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of the Act.”); Lopez v. River 
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2008); 
(“Courts consistently find that transgendered persons are not a protected class under Title 
VII per se.”) Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 11373 at *2 (S.D. Ind., June 6, 2003) (“Sweet’s intent to change his sex does not 
support a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII because that intended behavior did not 
place him within the class of persons protected under Title VII from discrimination based on 
sex.”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (“What makes 
Schroer’s sex stereotyping theory difficult is that. when the plaintiff is transsexual, direct 
evidence of discrimination based on sex stereotypes may look a great deal like 
discrimination based on transsexuality itself, a characteristic that, in and of itself, nearly all 
federal courts have said is unprotected by Title VII.”). 
 113. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676; see also, Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750. 
 114. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676. 
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violated Title IX because it illegally engaged in sex stereotyping by 
denying him the right to use the men’s bathroom and locker room.115  The 
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins first 
articulated a claim for sex stereotyping.116  In Price Waterhouse, the 
plaintiff, a non-transgender female accountant, was denied partnership in 
the accounting firm because she failed to conform to the gender stereotypes 
of a female.117  Several reasons were advanced for failure to promote.118  
For example, she was seen as “macho” and she was “overcompensated for 
a woman”. Additionally, it was said she needed to take “a course at charm 
school” and used too much profanity for a female.119  After reviewing the 
case, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision when it held that 
employment discrimination based on sex stereotypes constitutes sex 
discrimination under Title VII.120  The Johnston Court, however, found the 
allegations proffered by Seamus were insufficient to state a claim under a 
sex stereotyping theory.121 
The court noted that Seamus had not alleged that the university 
discriminated against him because of the way he looked, acted or spoke, 
and specifically, “he did not behave, walk, talk, or dress in a manner 
inconsistent with any preconceived notions of gender stereotypes.”122  
Rather, the court found that Seamus merely alleged that the university 
refused to allow him the use the bathroom based on his gender identity.123  
The court determined that merely denying an individual to use the restroom 
based on his or her gender identity does not constitute sex stereotyping.124 
2. G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board 
The 2016 high profile case of G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board 
involved a transgender high school male student who brought a Title IX 
claim against a school for requiring him to use the bathroom based on his 
biological sex.125  In Gloucester, the plaintiff, Gavin Grimm, was 
diagnosed with gender dysphoria.126  He underwent hormone therapy 
 
 115. Id. at 680. 
 116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 117. Id. at 278. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676. 
 122. Id. at 681. 
 123. Id. 
 124. The court emphasized the fact that Johnston never alleged that the university harassed 
or discriminated against him because of his transgender status.  Also, the court noted that 
the university had allowed Johnston to live as a male in all aspects of his life with the 
exception of allowing him to use the men’s bathroom and men’s locker room.  Id. (citing 
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir.2007)). 
 125. 822 F.3d. 706, 713, 715 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 126. “Gender dysphoria (formerly Gender Identity Disorder) is defined by strong, 
persistent feelings of identification with the opposite gender and discomfort with one’s own 
assigned sex that results in significant distress or impairment.  People with gender dysphoria 
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beginning in his freshman year in high school at which time he legally 
changed his name to Gavin.127  He lived all aspects of his life as a boy, but 
did not undergo sex reassignment surgery.128 
Before his sophomore year began, Grimm and his mother told school 
officials that he was a transgender boy.129  School officials were supportive 
and took steps to make sure teachers and staff treated him as a boy.130  In 
this supportive environment, Grimm requested that school officials allow 
him to use the boy’s bathroom, and the school officials granted him 
permission.131  Grimm used the boy’s bathroom without incidence for 
approximately seven weeks.132  When his use of the boy’s bathroom 
became known by others in the community, the Gloucester County School 
Board (“the Board”) was contacted in an effort to prevent Grimm from 
continuing to use the boy’s bathroom.133 
At a school board meeting, held December 9, 2014, by a vote of 6-1, 
the Board adopted a new school policy. The policy read in part:  
It shall be the practice of [Gloucester County Public Schools] to 
provide male and female bathroom and locker room facilities in its 
school, and the use of said facilities shall be limited to the 
corresponding biological genders, and students with gender 
identity issues shall be provided an alternative appropriate private 
facility.134 
The Board also indicated it would update school bathrooms to improve 
student privacy and it would, among other things, construct single-stall 
unisex bathrooms available to all students.135  Nevertheless, this newly 
adopted policy was unsatisfactory because it precluded Grimm from using 
the boy’s bathrooms.136  Although unisex bathrooms were available to 
Grimm under this policy, he did not find them to be a suitable alternative 
because they made him “feel even more stigmatized . . . and being required 
to use the separate bathrooms set him apart from his peers, and serve[d] as 
a daily reminder that the school view[ed] him as ‘different.’”137  As a result, 
on June 11, 2015, Grimm sued the Board seeking a preliminary injunction 
 
desire to live as members of the opposite sex and often dress and use mannerisms associated 
with the other gender.”  Id. (citing Gender Dysphoria, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (2017), https:// 
www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/gender-dysphoria (last visited Oct. 17, 2017)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. 706, 713, 715 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 132. Id. at 715–16. 
 133. Id. at 716. 
 134. Id. 
 135. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 716. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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to allow him to use the boy’s bathroom.138   
The district court held a hearing on Grimm’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction on July 27, 2015, and also on the Board’s motion to dismiss 
Grimm’s lawsuit.139  At the hearing, the district court orally dismissed 
Grimm’s Title IX claim, followed by written orders dated September 4, 
2015, and September 17, 2015, respectively, denying the injunction and 
dismissing Grimm’s Title IX claim.140  In its September 17, 2015, order, 
the district court’s rationale was clear.  Title IX prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sex not on the basis of other concepts such as gender identity or 
sexual orientation.141  The district court concluded that Grimm was female 
and that requiring him to use the female bathroom did not impermissibly 
discriminate against him on the basis of sex, which, if proven, would be in 
violation of Title IX.142 
Grimm appealed to the United States Court of Appeals requesting 
reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his Title IX claim.143  In support 
of Grimm’s appeal, the United States filed an amicus brief in order to 
defend the federal government’s interpretation of Title IX as requiring 
schools to provide transgender students access to bathrooms congruent with 
their gender identity.144  On appeal the United States Court of Appeal 
reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case.145  The court’s rationale 
for the reversal is circular but noteworthy.146 
In the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the majority opinion relied 
heavily on the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
interpretation of the law and used the Department of Education’s 
interpretation as its basis of understanding the law and the 
application of the law.147  The court noted that not all distinctions 
based on sex violate Title IX.148  For example, it does not violate 
Title IX for an educational institution receiving federal funds to 
maintain “separate living facilities for the different sexes.”149  The 
court cited extensively 34 Code of Federal Regulations §106.33 
(“§106.33”) which allows “separate toilet, locker room, and 
shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for 
 
 138. Id. at 717. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 718. 
 146. See id. 
 147. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 718. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1686). 
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students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided 
for students of the other sex.”150   
However, how is §106.33 to be interpreted and applied?  Is the 
language ambiguous or unambiguous and if so, what difference does it 
make?  In an opinion letter, dated January 7, 2015, the Department of 
Education’s Office of Civil Rights construed how §106.33 should be 
applied to transgender individuals.151  According to the opinion letter: 
“When a school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis 
of sex, in those situations, a school generally must treat transgender 
students consistent with their gender identity.”152  Notably, at the original 
trial, the district court failed to follow the Department of Education’s 
interpretation of §106.33 and instead found that the regulation was 
unambiguous because “‘it clearly allows the School Board to limit 
bathroom access on the basis of sex,’ including birth or biological sex.”153 
Conversely, the Department of Education contended that §106.33 was 
ambiguous because it was silent as to the meaning of the phrases “students 
of one sex” and “students of the other sex” in the context of transgender 
students.154 
The court in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board indicated that if 
it found the regulation to be unambiguous, as held by the district court, the 
Department of Education’s interpretation would not be given Auer 
deference.155  Therefore, the court began its analysis by first determining 
whether §106.33 actually contained an ambiguity.156   
The Court of Appeals determined that the regulation §106.33 allows 
schools to exclude males from female facilities and vice versa.157  
However, the appellate court noted that the regulation did not determine 
whether a transgender individual would be a male or female “for purposes 
of access to sex-segregated bathrooms.”158  Thus, the appellate court 
determined that the regulation had more than one valid reading as to the 
 
 150. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.33). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 715, 718; see also Letter From James A. Ferg-Cardima, Acting Deputy 
Assistance Secretary for Policy, United States Department of Education Office of Civil 
Rights, to Emily T. Prince, Esq. (Jan. 7, 2015) available at http://www.bricker.com/docume 
nts/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_1-2015.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).   
 153. G.G., 822 F.3d. at 718 (quoting G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. 132 
F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 
2016)). 
 154. Id. at 719. 
 155. Auer deference means that the agency is given deference in interpreting its 
regulations. G.G., 822 F.3d. at 720; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding 
that when an agency interprets its own regulation it is entitled to near-absolute deference 
unless it “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). 
 156. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 720.  
 157. Id.   
 158. Id.   
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meaning of the “maleness or femaleness.”159  As such, the court found the 
regulation to be ambiguous as applied to transgender individuals.160 
Since the Court of Appeals determined that the regulation was 
ambiguous as applied to transgender individuals, the Department of 
Education’s interpretation would be given deference unless the School 
Board could show that the Department of Education’s interpretation was 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation or statute,”161 and that 
the deference was unreasonable.  The appellate court noted at the time Title 
IX was adopted in 1975, there were two dictionary definitions and 
interpretations of the word “sex.”162  According to the first definition, the 
word “sex” means “‘the character of being either male or female’ or ‘the 
sum of those anatomical and physiological differences with reference to 
which the male and female are distinguished.’”163  According to the second 
definition the word “sex” is described as: 
The sum of the morphological, physiological and behavioral 
peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction 
with its concomitant genetic segregation and recombination which 
underlie most evolutionary change, that in its typical dichotomous 
occurrence is usually genetically controlled and associated with 
special sex chromosomes and that is typically manifested as 
maleness and femaleness.164 
Although the appellate court’s majority reasoned that these two 
definitions suggest that at the time Title IX was enacted, the term “sex” 
was understood to denote a male, and was mainly based on biological sex, 
these classic definitions were not the only way that the term “sex” could be 
defined.165   
In addition, to warrant deference to the Department of Education’s 
interpretation of §106.33 for transgender individuals, the interpretation had 
to be reasonable.166  In determining whether this interpretation was 
reasonable, the court looked at the Department of Education’s position on 
transgender individuals and found it to have been consistently enforced 
since 2014.167  Furthermore, the Department’s position that maleness and 
femaleness is determined by one’s gender was in line with existing 
guidance and regulations of various federal agencies, including the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”); the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); the Department of 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 721 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461). 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. (quoting American College Dictionary 1109 (1970)). 
 164. Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2081 (1971)). 
 165. Id.  
 166. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 721.  
 167. Id. 
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Housing and Urban Development, and the Office of Personnel 
Management.168  On this basis, the majority of the appellate court 
determined that the Department of Education’s interpretation of §106.33, as 
it relates to bathroom access by transgender individuals, was entitled to 
deference and should be the controlling weight in the case.169  Accordingly, 
the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Grimm’s Title IX 
claim.170 
B. THE TITLE VII CLAIM - EMPLOYMENT 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that provides in pertinent part 
that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin,” addresses discrimination in the 
 
 168. Id.; see also Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395 (E.E.O.C. 2013), available 
at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/EEOC-Lusardi-Decision.pdf 
(holding that the employer’s decision to prevent the transgender employee from using the 
restroom based on her gender identity violated Title VII).  In May 2016, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission published a fact sheet titled Bathroom Access for 
Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressing 
transgender employees’ rights in the workplace and reiterating its conclusion reached in the 
Lusardi case. Fact Sheet: Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://w 
ww.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-bathroom-access-transgender.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 
2017).  In June 2015, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration provided guidance 
to employers through a publication titled a Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender 
Workers that stated the following: “The core belief underlying these policies is that all 
employees should be permitted to use the facilities that correspond with their gender 
identity.  For example, a person who identifies as a man should be permitted to use men’s 
restrooms, and a person who identifies as a woman should be permitted to use women’s 
restrooms.  The employee should determine the most appropriate and safest option for him-
or herself.” Best Practices: A Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers, United 
States Department of Labor: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, https:// 
www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3795.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); Guidance 
Regarding the Employment of Transgender Individuals in the Federal Workplace, U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversity-
and-inclusion/reference-materials/gender-identity-guidance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) 
(stating that for “a transitioning employee, this means that, once he or she has begun 
working in the gender that reflects his or her gender identity, agencies should allow access 
to restrooms and (if provided to other employees) locker room facilities consistent with his 
or her gender identity”); “HUD assumes that a recipient or a sub-recipient (‘provider’) that 
makes decisions about eligibility or placement into single-sex emergency shelters or 
facilities will place a potential client (or a current client seeking a new assignment) in a 
shelter or a facility that corresponds to the gender with which the person identifies, taking 
health and safety into consideration.”  Appropriate Placement for Transgender Persons in 
Single-Sex Emergency Shelters and Other Facilities, Notice CPD-15-02, U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (2015) available at https://www.hudexchange.info/ 
resources/documents/Notice-CPD-15-02-Appropriate-Placement-for-Transgender-Persons-
in-Single-Sex-Emergency-Shelters-and-Other-Facilities.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).   
 169. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d. at 723. 
 170. Id. 
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workplace.171  To establish a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must be established that he or 
she “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) suffered an adverse 
employment action; (3) was qualified for the position in question; and (4) 
was treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of his 
protected class.”172  The following cases are of interest and help to 
understand the application of this law when a plaintiff files a Title VII 
claim against an employer for failing to allow the use of a bathroom based 
on gender identity. 
1. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority 
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority173 the plaintiff, Krystal Etsitty, a 
female transgender individual, sued Utah Transit Authority because she 
was allegedly terminated for failure to “conform to their expectations of 
stereotypical male behavior.”174  Both parties filed for summary judgment.  
Etsitty was born as a biological male, but identified as a woman and 
dressed as a female outside of work.175  Diagnosed with gender dysphoria, 
Etsitty began taking female hormones.176  A few years later, she applied for 
and received a position as a bus operator with the UTA.177  During the 
training period, Etsitty presented herself as a male and used the male 
bathrooms.178  Shortly thereafter, she met with her supervisor informing 
him that she was transgender and would begin appearing at work as a 
female.179  Initially, her supervisor expressed support for Etsitty and 
indicated that there should be no problem with her transgender status.180  
Following this meeting with her supervisor, Etsitty began wearing makeup, 
jewelry, and acrylic nails to work and began using the female bathrooms 
while on her route.181  Along the route, bus operators have permission to 
use the bathrooms of selected businesses but that right is revocable.182 
Subsequently, Betty Shirley, the operations manager of the UTA 
division where Etsitty worked, became concerned about the bathroom 
Etsitty would be using, male or female, and spoke to Bruce Cardon, a 
human resource generalist for Shirley’s division.183  Afterwards, a meeting 
 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 172. Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 
F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 173. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 174. Id. at 1218. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1218–19. 
 178. Id. at 1219. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1219.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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was set up with Etsitty to discuss the matter.184  At the meeting, concern 
was expressed and questions posed as to whether Etsitty would switch back 
and forth between the male and female bathroom, especially since she had 
not undergone a sex-change operation.185  After the meeting, Etsitty was 
placed on administrative leave and ultimately terminated.186  One reason 
advanced for Etsitty’s termination was the potential liability for UTA 
“from co-workers, customers, and the general public” resulting from 
Etsitty’s usage of the female bathroom.187 
To support her claim of sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII, Etsitty 
presented two separate legal theories.188  Under the first theory, she alleged 
she suffered sex discrimination based on her status as a transgender.189 
Under the second theory, she alleged she suffered sex discrimination 
because she failed to conform to sex stereotypes.190   
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first 
addressed whether transgender status is a protected class under Title VII.191  
Since this appellate court had never addressed this question, it relied on a 
line of other court decisions that have held that transgender status is not a 
protected class under the law.192  Based on this reliance, the court 
concluded that Etsitty’s first legal theory, sex discrimination based on her 
transgender status, failed.193 
The appellate court next addressed Etsitty’s second legal theory that 
she suffered from sex discrimination because she failed to conform to the 
social stereotypes about how a man should act or appear.194  On this issue, 
the appellate court assumed that Etsitty had satisfied her prima facie burden 
under the Price Waterhouse theory of gender stereotyping, thereby shifting 
the burden to UTA to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
Etsitty’s termination.195  Recall, UTA’s reason for termination was based 
on the potential liability it faced because Etsitty intended to use the female 
bathroom.196  Clearly, it would not always be possible to accommodate 
Etsitty’s bathroom preference because UTA drivers, like Etsitty, typically 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1221. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)) (“A transsexual individual’s decision to undergo sex 
change surgery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within the scope 
of Title VII.  This court refuses to extend the coverage of Title VII to situations that 
Congress clearly did not contemplate.”). 
 193. Id. at 1222. 
 194. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1222–23. 
 195. Id. at 1224. 
 196. Id. 
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use public bathrooms along their routes rather than bathrooms at the UTA 
facility.197  In response, Etsitty argued that basing her termination on her 
intent to use the female bathroom “is essentially another way of stating that 
she was terminated for failing to conform to sex stereotypes.”198 
The appellate court disagreed with Etsitty and concluded that the 
UTA’s concern constituted a nondiscriminatory, legitimate reason for 
termination.199  According to the court, “Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination, however, does not extend so far [and] . . . [u]sing the 
bathroom designated for the opposite sex does not constitute a . . . failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes.”200 
Since the appellate court concluded that the UTA had provided a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Etsitty’s termination, the burden 
shifted to Etsitty to show there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the proffered reason was a pretext which would preclude summary 
judgment sought by both parties.201  Etsitty contended that a rational jury 
could conclude that she was terminated because she did not act and appear, 
as the UTA believed a man should, and she pointed to evidence in the 
record, including the deposition testimony of the UTA employees who 
expressed concern about Etsitty using the bathroom.202  Specifically, Etsitty 
pointed to Shirley’s statements that: “We both felt that there was an image 
out there for us, that we could have a problem with having someone who, 
even though his appearance may look female, he’s still a male because he 
still has a penis.”203  Additionally, Etsitty pointed to Cardon’s statements 
that: “We have expectations of operators and how they appear to the public 
if we see something that is considered radical or could be interpreted by the 
public as being inappropriate, we talk to the operators about that and expect 
them to have a professional appearance.”204 
After a complete review of the deposition testimony, the appellate 
court concluded that these statements did not provide sufficient evidence of 
pretext to preclude summary judgment in favor of UTA.205  To support this 
position, the appellate court pointed to Shirley’s statements after she 
mentioned Etsitty’s appearance.206  In those statements, Shirley explained 
that the problem with Etsitty’s appearance was that Etsitty may not be able 
to find a unisex bathroom on the route, thereby exposing UTA to 
liability.207  Moreover, the court observed that when Cardon was asked 
 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1225. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1225.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1225–26. 
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what he found unprofessional about Etsitty’s appearance, he responded 
with concerns about her bathroom selection.208  Thus, the court concluded 
that, when the deposition testimony of Shirley and Cardon were read in 
their entirety and in context, it provided additional proof that the UTA did 
not terminate Etsitty because she failed to conform with gender 
stereotypes.209  Instead, the court determined that the testimony proved that 
the UTA terminated Etsitty because she was a biological male who 
intended to use the women’s public bathroom.210  Based on the evidence, 
the court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment 
in favor of the UTA on Etsitty’s Title VII claim.211 
2. Roberts v. Clark County School District 
The case of Roberts v. Clark County School District also involved a 
transgender employee who brought a Title VII claim after being denied the 
right to use the bathroom based on his gender identity.212  The plaintiff, 
Bradley Roberts, a transgender police officer with the Clark County School 
District in Nevada, was born female but identified as a male.213  His 
employment with the school district began in 1992 and continued without 
any incident until he began dressing as a male for work in 2011.214  At that 
time, he also began using the men’s bathroom at work.215  When others 
complained, Roberts’ commanding officers scheduled a meeting with 
him.216  During the meeting, Roberts was informed that he could no longer 
use the men’s bathroom and he should “confine himself to the gender 
neutral bathrooms to avoid any further complaints.”217 
In response, Roberts sent a letter to his superior explaining that he was 
changing his name to Bradley; he wanted his coworkers to use male 
pronouns when referring to him; and he wanted to use the men’s 
bathroom.218  A meeting to discuss the matter was held in November 2011, 
and at that time, it was decided that Roberts could be referred to as a man 
but was not allowed to use the men’s or women’s bathroom.219  Instead, he 
had to use a gender-neutral or single occupancy bathroom until he could 
provide documentation of a sex change.220  Roberts’ lawsuit alleging a 
violation of Title VII followed.221 
 
 208. Id. at 1226. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1227. 
 212. Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F.Supp.3d 1001 (D. Nev. 2016). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 1004–05. 
 215. Id. at 1005. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F.Supp.3d at 1005.  
 219. Id. at 1005–06. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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On his Title VII claim, the United States District Court of Nevada 
answered the question of whether Title VII’s protection against sex 
discrimination includes protection for gender identity.222  In answering this 
question and in support of its decision, the district court cited the Ninth 
Circuit’s unpublished decision in Kastl v. Maricopa County Community 
College District.  The 2004 decision in Kastl signaled the direction of the 
Ninth Circuit’s position in transgender Title VII cases.223  Notably, the 
Kastl case, previously mentioned in this article, involved a transgender 
adjunct instructor who sued the Estrella Mountain Community College 
after she was banned from the women’s bathroom.224  In Kastl, the Ninth 
Circuit found a prima facie case of gender discrimination on “the theory 
that impermissible gender stereotypes were a motivating factor” in the 
community college’s actions against the transgender instructor.225 
The district court in Roberts also referenced the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision Schwenk v. Hartford.226  The Schwenk court expanded the analysis 
of Title VII and struggled with question of whether the Gender Motivated 
Violence Act (“GMVA”) covered transgender individuals.227  The Act 
provides a federal protected civil-rights cause of action for victims of 
gender-motivated violence.228  The Act also protects men who were 
sexually assaulted by other men.229  The Schwenk court examined the term 
“sex” under Title VII and found that it encompasses “both sex—that is, 
biological differences between men and women—and gender,” a term 
which was used to “refer to an individual's sexual identity.”230  
Additionally, the district court found that the GMVA parallels Title VII, 
which means that like Title VII, the GMVA prohibits discrimination based 
on a person’s gender identity.231  Based on Schwenk, the district court in 
Roberts reasoned that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit would likely hold that gender-identity discrimination is actionable 
under Title VII.232 
Accordingly, the district court in Roberts held that discrimination based 
on a person’s gender identity violates Title VII discrimination because it 
 
 222. Id. at 1011. 
 223. Id. at 1012–13 (citing Kastl v. Maricopa County Community College District, 325 
F.App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 224. It should be noted that the court granted the community college’s motion for 
summary judgment because the employee failed to provide sufficient evidence that the 
community college’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying her the right to use 
the women’s restroom was a pretext.  Kastl, 325 F.App’x at 493. 
 225. See id.   
 226. Id. at 1014 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 227. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. 
 230. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Roberts, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1014. 
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amounts to sexual discrimination.233  The district court explained that the 
Roberts’ employer, the Clark County School District, did not challenge 
Roberts regarding all of the four necessary elements of a prima facie case 
of discrimination, but merely challenged: (1) whether he had actually 
suffered an adverse employment action and (2) whether the employer 
treated him differently than a similarly situated employee who did not 
belong to the same protected class.234 
On the question of whether banning Roberts from the bathroom was an 
adverse employment action, the court concluded that it was.235  In reaching 
this conclusion, the district court referenced and adopted the EEOC’s 
decision in Lusardi v. McHugh.236  In Lusardi, the EEOC addressed the 
issue of whether a transgender employee proved that she was subjected to 
disparate treatment and harassment based on sex when her employer, the 
U.S. Army Aviation and Research Development and Engineering Center, 
among other things, restricted her from using the common female 
bathroom.237  The EEOC concluded that the employer’s decision to prevent 
Lusardi from using the bathroom based on her gender identity violated 
Title VII.238  The EEOC explained that “[e]qual access to bathrooms is a 
significant, basic condition of employment” and concluded that segregating 
bathroom access based on a person’s transgender status constitutes a 
significant harm for transgender individuals.239  
On the question of whether the school district treated Roberts 
differently than similarly situated employees, the district court also 
affirmed.240  The court based its decision on evidence that Roberts was not 
allowed to use the female bathroom, which meant that he was treated 
differently than other females.241  Further, the court concluded that the 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1015; see also Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 
(9th Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)) 
(“To state a prima facie claim for discrimination, the plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs 
to a protected class, (2) performed his job satisfactorily, (3) he suffered an adverse 
employment action, and (4) the employer treated him differently than a similarly situated 
employee who does not belong to the same protected class.”). 
 235. Roberts, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1015. 
 236. Id. 
 237. The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to 
discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, 
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, 
age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.”  Overview, U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited on July 31, 
2017); see also, Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395 (E.E.O.C. 2013), http://trans 
genderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/EEOC-Lusardi-Decision.pdf.  
 238. Overview, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov 
/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited July 31, 2017); see also Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 
0120133395 (E.E.O.C. 2013), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ 
EEOC-Lusardi-Decision.pdf.  
 239. Roberts, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1015. 
 240. Id. at 28. 
 241. Id.  
3 - FLEMMING_MACRO_REDLINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2018  4:22 PM 
188 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:2 
school district failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the bathroom ban.  Thus, the court granted summary judgment in Roberts’s 
favor on the question of whether the school district discriminated against 
Roberts under Title VII.242 
IV. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN ENACTING  
BIOLOGY-BASED LAWS 
Only a handful of cases have dealt with transgender bathroom laws and 
these cases have resulted in inconsistent holdings. As such, it is difficult, 
likely impossible in most cases, to determine how a court will hold when 
confronted with transgender bathroom policies or laws in both the public 
educational and employment sectors.243   
Albeit few in numbers, an examination of federal cases that have been 
decided can reasonably highlight facts and factors to consider when a state 
is contemplating whether to enact biology-based or gender-identity based 
transgender bathroom laws for students and employees.   
A. THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR 
Let’s compare the facts in Johnston v. University of Pittsburg of the 
Commonwealth System of Higher Education with those in G.G. v. 
Gloucester County School Board.244  First, let’s examine the type of setting.  
The Johnston case involved a transgender college student in Pittsburg, 
Pennsylvania, who enrolled in the school as a female, but held himself out 
to be a male throughout his entire tenure at the university.245  Next, let’s 
examine the response from the school when they became aware of the 
issue.  In Johnston, after the student informed the post-secondary school of 
his transgender status, the school did not support the right of the student to 
use the bathroom based on his gender identity.246  Despite this fact, the 
student continued to use the men’s bathroom and locker rooms and was 
even sanctioned for his failure to comply with the school’s request to stop 
using these facilities.247 
Comparatively, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board involved a 
transgender student who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and 
attended a secondary school in Gloucester, Virginia.248  He was not a 
college student as in Johnston.  And unlike the college in Johnston, when 
the high school student and his mother informed the school of his 
 
 242. Using the same analysis, the court concluded that the school district in precluding 
Roberts from using the male and female restrooms also violated N.R.S. 613.330, which 
prevents employers from discriminating against employees based on gender identity.  Id. at 
*29. 
 243. See supra notes 94-171. 
 244. See id. 
 245. See supra notes 94-125. 
 246. See supra notes 94-125. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See supra notes 126-171. 
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transgender status, the school initially allowed him to use the boy’s 
bathroom and only back peddled on it its decision after receiving negative 
publicity.249  It seems ironic that the secondary school in G.G. v. Gloucester 
County School Board—where students are younger and more impressible 
students—was initially more supportive of a gender identity-based 
bathroom choice than the post-secondary school in the Johnston case—
where the students are older and less impressionable.250 
The court’s conclusions in the two cases were very different.251  The 
court in Johnston, decided on the district court level that preventing the 
college level transgender student from using the men’s bathroom did not 
violate Title IX, whereas the appellate court in G.G. v. Gloucester County 
School Board concluded that preventing the secondary education level 
transgender student from using the boy’s bathroom violated Title IX.252  
These very different decisions were reached based on completely different 
analysis by the courts in these cases.253 
The Johnston holding that Title XI is not violated when a transgender 
student is denied the right to use a bathroom because of a biology-based 
policy was decided in March 2015 without any consideration of the 
Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter stating that transgender 
students should be allowed to use the bathroom or other public facilities 
based on the gender identity.254  Instead, the district court in Johnston used 
as guidance the Eighth Circuit’s Title VII cases, including Sommers v. 
Budget Marketing, Inc., holding that transgender employees are not 
protected under Title VII.255  Further, the Johnston court determined that 
the student had not sufficiently alleged sex discrimination based on sex 
stereotyping.256  The district court’s conclusion was based on its finding 
that the student did not claim that the university discriminated against him 
because of the way he looked, acted or spoke and he never alleged that the 
university harassed him.257  The district court found that the student’s only 
allegation was that he was denied the right to use the bathroom based on 
his gender identity, which in the court’s opinion was not enough to 
constitute a sex-stereotyping claim.258 
In contrast, G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board was decided in 
2016.  Unlike the district court in Johnston, the appellate court in G.G. v. 
Gloucester County School Board considered the Department of 
Education’s January 7, 2015, letter and used it as a basis for determining 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See supra notes 94-171. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See supra notes 94-125. 
 255. See id; see also, Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 256. See supra notes 94-125. 
 257. Id.  
 258. See supra notes 94-125. 
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whether the biology-based bathroom laws violated the transgender 
student’s Title IX rights.259  On May 13, 2016, approximately one month 
after the G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board case was decided, 
President Barack Obama provided further guidance to public schools and 
universities grappling with the issue of whether to allow transgender 
students to use public bathrooms or facilities based on their biology or their 
gender identity.260  
Specifically, in a joint letter from the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Education, the Obama administration made it clear that 
students in schools should be allowed to use the bathroom based on their 
gender identity.261  This letter, in pertinent part, stated that: “When a school 
provides sex-segregated activities and facilities, transgender students must 
be allowed to participate in such activities and access such facilities 
consistent with their gender identity.”262 
Thereafter, failing to prevail at the appellate level, the Gloucester 
County School Board petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, and 
the Court granted the school board’s writ of certiorari on October 28, 
2016.263  However, in January 2017 a new United States president was 
sworn into office and on February 22, 2017, the newly elected President, 
Donald Trump, revoked the federal guidelines issued under the Obama 
administration that protected transgender students.  The revocation 
effectively placed in the hands of the states and school districts the decision 
of whether or not transgender students should have access to bathrooms 
based on their gender identity.264 
 
 259. See supra notes 126-171. 
 260. Emanuella Grinberg, Feds Issue Guidance on Transgender Access to Public 
Restrooms, CNN, May 14, 2016, available at http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/12/politics/trans 
gender-bathrooms-obama-administration/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017); Julie Hirschfeld Davis 
& Matt Apuzzo, U.S. Directs Public Schools to Allow Access to Restrooms, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/us/politics/obama-administ 
ration-to-issue-decree-on-transgender-access-to-school-restrooms.html?r=0 (last visited Oct. 
7, 2017). 
 261. Letter from Department of Justice, Office for Civil Rights and Department of 
Education, Office of Civil Rights (May 13, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
file/850986/download (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).  
 262. Id.  
 263. See, Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., 137 S. Ct. 369 (Oct. 28, 2016). 
 264. In November 2016, Republican candidate Donald J. Trump won the presidential 
election beating Democratic candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton.  See Matt Flegenheimer & 
Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the 
Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/ 
09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html (last visited July 26, 2017) 
(“Donald John Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States on Tuesday in a 
stunning culmination of an explosive, populist and polarizing campaign that took relentless 
aim at the institutions and long-held ideals of American democracy.”); Letter from 
Department of Justice, Office for Civil Rights (Feb. 22, 2017), available at http://i2.cdn. 
turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/23/1atransletterpdf022317.pdf (last visited Jul. 24, 2017); 
see also, Greg Toppo, Trump Administration Pulls Transgender Restroom Rules; It Should 
Be Up to States to Decide Issue, White House Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 2017, at 3A 
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This revocation of federal guidelines was articulated in a joint letter 
from the Department of Education and the Department of Justice.265  The 
joint letter from the Trump administration specifically withdrew the 
Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter and the joint letter from 
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice dated May 13, 
2016.266  At the time of the Trump administration’s letter dated February 
22, 2017, the G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board case was still before 
the Supreme Court.267  Based on the Trump administration letter, the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case back to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to decide the case, without 
consideration of the Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter.268 
On August 2, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for this court to decide 
whether the case is moot since the high school student graduated in June 
2017.269  If the district court determines that the case is moot, there will be 
no decision in the case.  If the district court decides that the case is not 
moot, the Court of Appeals will have to decide the case without the 
Department of Education’s January 7, 2015, letter.   
Without this letter, there will be no interpretation by the Department of 
Education as to the meaning of how §106.33, allowing “separate toilet, 
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex” should be 
interpreted for transgender students.  Consequently, it is very possible that 
the ordinary definition of the term “sex” based on one’s biological sex at 
birth will be used to define the term.270  Moreover, given the current 
 
(“The Trump administration withdrew guidelines outlining which restrooms transgender 
students can use, potentially sowing confusion in schools, angering LGBTQ rights groups 
and adding uncertainty to a widely discussed case due to come before the U.S. Supreme 
Court next month.”); Ariane de Vogue, Mary Kay Mallonee & Emanuella Grinberg, Trump 
Administration Withdraws Federal Protection for Transgender Students, CNN, Feb. 23, 
2017, available at http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/22/politics/doj-withdraws-federal-protectio 
ns-on-transgender-bathrooms-in-schools/ (last visited July 20, 2017) (“The Trump 
administration on Wednesday night withdrew Obama-era protections for transgender 
students in public schools that let them use bathrooms and facilities corresponding with their 
gender identity.”); Jeremy W. Peters, Jo Becker & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Rescinds 
Rules on Bathroom for Transgender Students, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/devos-sessions-transgender-students-right 
s.html (last visited on July 20, 2017) (“In a joint letter, the top civil rights officials from the 
Justice Department and the Education Department rejected the Obama administration’s 
position that nondiscrimination laws require schools to allow transgender students to use the 
bathrooms of their choice.”).   
 265. See Letter from Department of Justice, Office for Civil Rights (Feb. 22, 2017), 
available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/23/1atransletterpdf022317.pdf 
(last visited July 24, 2017). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1626 (U.S., Mar. 6, 
2017). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 270. See supra notes 126-171. 
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political climate in the federal government to limit the rights of transgender 
students, it is very possible that the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit may find that the Gloucester County School Board’s 
biology-based transgender bathroom policy does not violate Title IX.271  
Furthermore, it is very likely that when states impose biology-based 
transgender bathroom policies for students, conservative courts may find 
that these laws do not violate Title IX.   
However, the victory is not completely won by proponents for biology-
based bathroom policies and laws.  If states adopt biology-based bathroom 
policies for students, there still may be potential liability under Title IX 
based on the theory of sex stereotyping, a claim articulated in the Price 
Waterhouse case.272  As previously mentioned, this case involved an 
accountant who was denied a job because she was “too macho” and was 
told that she needed to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”273  
In essence, the accountant was denied the position because she did not fit 
the gender stereotypes of a female.274  The Supreme Court in Price 
Waterhouse held that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis 
of gender” in violation of the law.275  
Although the United States Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not 
specifically address a transgender individual, the United Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit addressed this specific issue in Smith v. City of 
Salem.276  This case involved a transgender firefighter who was forced to 
resign and later brought a Title VII sex-stereotyping claim against her 
employer.277  The appellate court concluded that the employee had a 
cognizable claim under Title VII.278  In reaching, this holding the court 
stated the following: 
. . . discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and 
therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no 
different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in 
Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like 
a woman.  Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-
conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective 
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as “transsexual,” is not 
fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered 
 
 271. See id. 
 272. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1998). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Smith, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 277. Smith, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 278. Id. 
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discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.279 
In essence, the appellate court in Smith determined that a sex 
stereotyping claim may also exists for transgender individuals if an adverse 
action is taken against them because they fail to act according to certain 
preconceived notions about how a particular gender should act. 
This means that when states consider adopting biology-based 
transgender bathroom policies for students, they should be aware that in 
some jurisdictions this type of policy or law may be viewed as a form of 
sex stereotyping or a means of discriminating against individuals because 
of their failure to conform to preconceived notions about their biological 
sex.280  In those jurisdictions, a biology-based transgender bathroom policy 
would illegally violate Title IX.281  Thus, states in these jurisdictions should 
be wary about enacting biology-based transgender bathroom policies as 
these laws could potentially expose schools to legal liability. 
 B. THE EMPLOYMENT SECTOR 
First, before analyzing the employment cases discussed in this article, it 
should be noted that on December 15, 2014, the Obama administration 
issued a memorandum stating that “Title VII's prohibition of sex 
discrimination . . . encompasses discrimination based on gender identity, 
including transgender status.”282  Subsequently, at least two federal 
agencies—the EEOC and the OSHA—provided guidance to employers on 
the rights of transgender employees to use public bathrooms or facilities.283  
Specifically, in May 2016, the EEOC published a fact sheet titled 
Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 addressing transgender employees’ rights in the 
workplace and reiterating its conclusion reached in the Lusardi v. McHugh 
case, holding that an employer’s decision to prevent a transgender 
employee from using the bathroom based on her gender identity violated 
 
 279. Id. at 575. 
 280. Compare Roberts v. Clark Cnty Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1010 (D. Nev., 
Nov. 28, 2016) with Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d at 1219 (Etsitty argued that 
terminating her because she was going to use the female restroom was a form of sex 
stereotyping or was based on her failure to conform to gender stereotypes of a male.) 
 281. See Roberts v. Clark County School District, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1010 (D. Nev., 
Nov. 28, 2016). 
 282. See Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Op. Att’y Gen. Dec. 15, 2014), available at https://www.just 
ice.gov/file/188671/download (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
 283. See infra notes 237-240; see also Guidance Regarding the Employment of 
Transgender Individuals in the Federal Workplace issued by the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, OPM.GOV, available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversit 
y-and-inclusion/reference-materials/gender-identity-guidance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) 
(stating that for “a transitioning employee, this means that, once he or she has begun 
working in the gender that reflects his or her gender identity, agencies should allow access 
to restrooms and (if provided to other employees) locker room facilities consistent with his 
or her gender identity”). 
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Title VII.284 
Also, in June 2015, the OSHA provided guidance to employers through 
a publication titled a Guide to Bathroom Access for Transgender Workers 
that stated the following: 
The core belief underlying these policies is that all employees 
should be permitted to use the facilities that correspond with their 
gender identity. For example, a person who identifies as a man 
should be permitted to use men’s bathrooms, and a person who 
identifies as a woman should be permitted to use women’s 
bathrooms. The employee should determine the most appropriate 
and safest option for him- or herself.285 
In essence, the OSHA’s position is that transgender employees should 
be allowed to use the bathroom based on their gender identity.286  
However, on October 4, 2017, the Trump administration reversed the 
Obama administration’s memorandum dated December 15, 2016, by 
issuing a memorandum stating that “Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination encompasses discrimination between men and women but 
does not encompass discrimination based on gender identity per se, 
including transgender status.”287  Similar to rights of transgender students, 
 
 284. Fact Sheet: Bathroom Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, available at https:// 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-bathroom-access-transgender.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 
2017) (In May 2016, the EEOC published a fact sheet titled Bathroom Access for 
Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressing 
transgender employees’ rights in the workplace and reiterating its conclusion reached in the 
Lusardi case.); see also, Lusardi v. McHugh, Appeal No. 0120133395, available at 
http://op.bna.com.s3.amazonaws.com/eg.nsf/id/pdon9velpx/%24File/lusardi%20(eeoc%20d
ecision).pdf (last visited Oct. 17. 2017). 
 285. Guidance Regarding the Employment of Transgender Individuals in the Federal 
Workplace issued by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Fact Sheet: Bathroom 
Access for Transgender Employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/diversity-and-inclusion/reference-
materials/gender-identity-guidance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). 
 286. “With the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress created the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to assure safe and healthful 
working conditions for working men and women by setting and enforcing standards and by 
providing training, outreach, education and assistance.”  About OSHA, United States 
Department of Education, available at https://www.osha.gov/about.html (last visited on July 
31, 2017); see also, Best Practices: A Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers, 
available at https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3795.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).  
In June 2015, the OSHA provided guidance to employers through a publication titled a 
Guide to Restroom Access for Transgender Workers that stated the following: “The core 
belief underlying these policies is that all employees should be permitted to use the facilities 
that correspond with their gender identity.  For example, a person who identifies as a man 
should be permitted to use men’s restrooms, and a person who identifies as a woman should 
be permitted to use women’s restrooms.  The employee should determine the most 
appropriate and safest option for him-or herself.” 
 287. See Revised Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims (Op. 
Att’y Gen. Oct. 17, 2017), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/406743 
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the federal government has attempted to limit the rights of transgender 
employees.  Presently, the federal administrative guidelines from the EEOC 
and OSHA remain unchanged.  The question of whether biology-based 
transgender bathroom laws violate Title VII remains, but the answer to the 
question is as muddy as the great Mississippi River.  
Indeed, the ultimate determination of the question of whether biology-
based transgender bathroom laws and policies for employees violate Title 
VII is the United States Supreme Court.  However, until the Supreme Court 
decides this matter, the question will remain a topic of much debate.  Since 
this question has yet to be decided, perhaps a comparison of the handful of 
federal cases that have addressed this question, will be helpful.   
The Etsitty case involved a transgender bus driver who asked to be 
allowed to use the female bathrooms during her route.288  In other words, 
the employee was not requesting to use the restroom at her place of 
employment, but at locations away from her place of employment.289  
UTA, the employer of the transgender employee, claimed that it denied the 
employee’s request based on its concern for UTA’s potential liability 
resulting from the employee’s bathroom use while away from the 
employer’s place of business.290 
The Roberts case involved a transgender police officer that requested to 
use the men’s bathroom at his place of employment.291  Clark County 
School District, the employer, denied the employee’s request without any 
apparent explanation.292  The courts in Etsitty and Roberts reached very 
different conclusions on the question of whether the employers violated 
Title VII by preventing the employees from using the bathroom based on 
their gender identity.293  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit’s conclusion in Etsitty was that there was no violation of Title VII, 
whereas the district court in Roberts concluded that Title VII was 
violated.294 
Based on these very different conclusions, it appears that an 
employer’s liability for biology-based transgender bathroom laws may 
depend upon the jurisdiction in which the employment case is instituted.295  
For instance, in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the lawsuit was filed in 
the Tenth Circuit, which is a court that does not extend Title VII 
protections to transgender employees.296  On the other hand, the Roberts 
case was instituted in the Ninth Circuit, a circuit that would likely extend—
 
7/Sessions-memo-reversing-gender-identity-civil.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
 288. See supra notes 175-212. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See supra notes 175-212. 
 291. See supra notes 213-243. 
 292. See supra notes 213-243. 
 293. See supra notes 175-43. 
 294. Id. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See supra notes 175-212. 
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as the Roberts Court predicted—Title VII protection to transgender 
employees.297   
Although the facts of the cases were similar, the courts viewed the 
sufficiency of the plaintiff-employee’s evidence differently.298  For 
example, in Etsitty, the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, concluding that the employee failed to present evidence that the 
employer’s nondiscriminatory legitimate reason of not allowing her to use 
the bathroom was a pretext.299  On the other hand, in Roberts, the court 
concluded that the employee had presented enough evidence to preclude 
the defendant-employer from being granted summary judgment on Title 
VII.300  Arguably, the different determination of the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff-employee’s evidence by each court could be traced to the 
difference in protections for transgender employees in the Tenth and Ninth 
Circuits. 
Currently, it is unclear how a federal court will decide on the issue of 
whether state-enacted biology based transgender bathroom laws violates 
Title VII.  Nevertheless, the review of the existing federal cases reveal that 
courts in numerous jurisdictions have expanded the protections of the law 
to include transgender status based on the Price Waterhouse sex-
stereotyping theory.301  It can be argued that currently more courts now find 
Title VII protections for transgender employees.302  Nonetheless, this 
majority view may not be the view accepted by the Supreme Court when 
and if it addresses this issue, given the current political climate on the 
 
 297. See supra notes 213-243. 
 298. See supra notes 175-243. 
 299. See supra notes 175-212. 
 300. See supra notes 213-243. 
 301. See e.g., Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 Fed. Appx. 883 (11th Cir. 
2016) (reversing summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s claim that she was 
terminated from her job as an auto mechanic because she is transgender); Doe v. Arizona, 
No. CV-15-02399-PHX-DGC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36229 (D. Ariz., Mar. 21, 2016) 
(holding discrimination against a transgender employee constitutes sex-based discrimination 
under Title VII); Dawson v. H&H Electric., Inc., No. 4:14CV00583 SWW, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 122723 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 15, 2015) (holding that termination of a transgender 
employee based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination under Title VII); 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir., Apr. 4, 2017) 
(en banc) (holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII); Macy v. Holder, App. No. 0120120821, 2012 
EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, (EEOC App. 20, 2012) (The EEOC’s holding that Title VII 
prohibits workplace discrimination based on gender identity.). 
302. See Chai Feldblum, Vulnerable Population: Law, Policies in Practice and Social 
Norms: Coverage of Transgender Discrimination under Sex Discrimination Law, 14 J.L. 
SOC’Y 1, 24 (2013) (“In one respect, the Commission’s decision in Macy was just the 
Commission catching up with federal and state courts that had concluded that the gender 
stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse included protection for transgender individuals 
who had been discriminated against on the basis of their transgender status.”); Ilona M. 
Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se; Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 561, 563 (2007) (“The very acts that define transgender people as transgender are 
those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and behavior.”). 
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Federal level and the current composition of the Court. 
If a court follows what appears to be the majority view applied by 
Roberts Court, the court will conclude that biology-based bathroom laws 
violate Title VII.303  Thus, if states in the jurisdictions following the 
majority view enact transgender bathroom laws for employees, this will 
very likely create potential liability for state agencies and governmental 
employers.304  In effect, states in these jurisdictions should refrain from 
enacting biology-based transgender bathroom laws for employees since 
these laws will likely violate Title VII.305   
Overall, it appears that employees may have more protections than 
students when states adopt biology-based bathroom laws.  Indeed, the 
federal government no longer has guidelines directing schools to allow 
students to use the bathroom based on their gender identity.306  Moreover, a 
student’s claim that biology-based transgender bathroom laws violate Title 
IX may only exist if the student articulates a sex stereotyping claim and the 
case is in a jurisdiction that is willing to recognize such a claim.307   
On the other hand, currently, federal guidelines from the EEOC and the 
OSHA, directing employers to allow employees to use the bathroom or 
public facilities based on their gender identity, still exists.  Even more, the 
majority view of courts throughout the country appear to support the 
interpretation of Title VII protections for transgender employees based on a 
sex-stereotyping claim.308  Hence, it seems very likely that when states 
enact biology-based bathroom laws for employees, Title VII may be 
violated, unless the court follows what appears to be the minority view that 
no such protection exists.309   
Nevertheless, until more cases and additional guidance is provided, 
states should carefully consider whether to enact transgender bathroom 
laws in the first place.  Yet, if they choose to enact such laws, they should 
think twice about imposing biology- based transgender bathroom laws.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Recently, a few states have enacted transgender bathroom laws based 
on an individual’s gender identity.310  On the other hand, numerous states 
have considered enacting transgender bathroom laws based on the 
individual’s biological sex.311   In fact, the question of whether to enact 
gender-identity based bathroom laws or biology-based bathroom laws, have 
 
 303. See supra notes 215-245. 
 304. See id. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See supra notes 265-267.  
 307. See supra notes 273-281. 
 308. See supra notes 213-243. 
 309. See supra notes 175-212. 
 310. See supra notes 18-31. 
 311. See supra notes 32-88. 
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arisen in both the public educational and employment sectors.  In some 
cases, when biology-based laws have been enacted, the results have been 
lawsuits filed by students and employees claiming violations of Title IX 
and Title VII, respectively.  To lessen the potential liability for states and 
state agencies, including public schools and governmental employers, these 
laws should be based on the individual’s gender identification. 
 
 
 
